ESOC Working Paper 14: Formal Employment and Organized Crime - Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia

Publication Year
2019
Publisher
ESOC Working Paper Series
Abstract

Canonical models of crime emphasize economic incentives. Yet, causal evidence of sorting into criminal occupations in response to individual-level variation in incentives is limited. We link administrative socioeconomic microdata with the universe of arrests in Medellίn over a decade. We exploit exogenous variation in formal-sector employment around a socioeconomic-score cutoff, below which individuals receive benefits if not formally employed, to test whether a higher cost to formal-sector employment induces crime. Regression discontinuity estimates show this policy generated reductions in formal-sector employment and a corresponding spike in organized crime, but no effects on crimes of impulse or opportunity.

 

Additional Authors
Gaurav Khanna, Carlos Medina, Anant Nyshadham, and Jorge Tamayo
Citation

Citation Information: 
Khanna, G, C Medina, A Nyshadham, and J Tamayo, (2019). Formal Employment and Organized Crime: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia (ESOC Working Paper No. 14). Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Retrieved [date], from http://esoc.princeton.edu/wp14.

Publication Topic
Violence
Economic Development
Country
Publication Type
ESOC Working Paper