About Us

The Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) identifies, compiles, and analyzes micro-level conflict data and information on insurgency, civil war, and other sources of politically motivated violence worldwide. ESOC empowers the nation’s best minds with the quality of data and information needed to address some of the most enduring and pressing challenges to international security. Ultimately, ESOC is committed to providing warfighters and policymakers with greater expert analyses and recommendations for responding to security threats.

  • Press Release: Private Sector Can Grow Despite Violent Conflict, Princeton Study Shows Read more

  • Jake Shapiro and Eli Berman contribute to latest post by 'Owl in the Olive Tree' Read more

  • Cohesive Institutions and Political Violence Read more

  • Image for ESOC Working Paper 10

    ESOC Working Paper: Do Museums Promote Reconiliation? Read more

  • New Publication: Small Wars, Big Data -- The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict Read more

  • ESOC Working Paper 9: A New Resource Curse - map

    ESOC Working Paper: A New Resource Curse Read more

  • ESOC Working Paper: Hard Traveling Read more

  • ESOC Working Paper: Displaced Loyalties - map

    ESOC Working Paper: Displaced Loyalties Read more

  • ESOC Policy Paper: Understanding Risk and Resilience to Violent Conflicts Read more

  • ESOC Working Paper: Image of Mining Locations in Africa and Start Years

    ESOC Working Paper: Concession Stands: How Foreign Investment Incites Protest in Africa Read more

Research Highlights

Will the developing world fall under China’s sway? Many policymakers in Washington certainly fear so, which is one of the reasons they have created the new International Development Finance Corp. (IDFC), which is slated to begin operating at the end of this year.

We are pleased to share the Woodrow Wilson School’s new press release concerning findings from our recently completed study, Private Sector Development in Conflict Affected States: A Report to the U.K.

Working Papers

Can institutionalized transfers of resource rents be a source of civil conflict? Are cohesive institutions better at managing conflicts over distribution?